Who is 1e100.net

I run Chrome so assume it might have something to do with that, but why is there so little information about it?

It does not ONLY relate to google safe browsing. From Google Help :. Following standard industry practice, we make sure each IP address has a corresponding hostname. In October , we started using a single domain name to identify our servers across all Google products, rather than use different product domains such as youtube. We did this for two reasons: first, to keep things simpler, and second, to proactively improve security by protecting against potential threats such as cross-site scripting attacks.

Most typical Internet users will never see 1e Lots of Google services use 1e For example Google safebrowsing feature or I should say snitch is being used no matter what you choose.

Even if you disable any option on chrome to prevent safebrowsing, you will still have lots of connections to 1e I have been trying to block all connections to 1e Even if you tell Chrome not to do that! Here is the screenshot from Comodo Killswitch after I did those steps:. Not only that, GoogleUpdate. I used Comodo Firewall the block 1e It even pass through firewall.

I don't know how but it does! That's a clever way to get through firewalls. Since there is huge number of IP addresses belonging to 1e On the other way, so other services also use 1e I recommend to use Firefox as browser of course you will still need to disable safebrowing in Firefox and stop using Google products.

I know it is a painful experience to do it but it had to be done! Let us know what you have to say:. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Define your site main menu. Follow Us! Rate this article:. Mail this article Print this article. How to Reinstall Internet Explorer. DougBTX on June 5, root parent next [—]. If it is never going to be exposed to the public internet, you might as well use.

I could see an IT department using these misguidedly for purely internal purposes:. These are now registered TLDs.

You are begging for someone to misconfigure something if you use trivial TLD names internally. It USED to be that. The point is that some standard CAN change any other similar thing at any point in the future; particularly now that you can buy a TLD. Thus the lesson is, buy a real name and reserve the namespace.

DNS servers should never route a query for that domain. I sadly forgot the number, so cant cite it. There are two interwoven threads of logic in my post. You've mistaken the second as limited to the first when it is building upon it.

Don't do anything like. That is why the current best practice is now to have an internal subdomain of a real domain even if not globally published.

Domain name ending in local, may be resolved concurrently via other mechanisms, e. Nothing is really safe. Maybe an emoticon? IIRC, the use of emoticons was stopped after someone registered the poop symbol on. What's worse about dev is that chrome auto-forwarded to the https version even if you were using it internally for testing using your hosts file.

That is the hsts preload list, used across bruises;. Somewhat common pattern for C is using names like foosrv For convenience of the DevOps team it even makes sense for such hostnames to be publicly resolvable to your internal IPs.

One issue with doing this is that it tends to break in various wonderful ways when you internally use Windows and Active Directory. For various security reasons it's a bad idea for your internal hostnames to be publicly resolvable from anywhere on the internet, unless you're on a VPN, and therefore possible for your client device stub resolver to query the internal DNS server that only talks to internal IP space.

In my opinion the convenience gained is more significant than these mostly theoretical "various security reasons". In other words when exposing hostnames and addresses of your internal infrastructure to the public internet has meaningful security ramifications then you have considerably more critical security problem.

I hope you never have to experience the non-theoretical side of that decision. The benefits of being able to resolve internal IPs external isn't even really a benefit - if I can't resolve internal. With additional knowledge of their internal network exposed by the information leak from DNS, the damage a blackhat could have done is untold.

The problem isn't the exposition of hostnames and addresses, the problem is if blackhats do manage to get access to the internal network through whatever means; breaking into the VPN, a hole in the firewall, social engineering, RCE in the public facing website as in Google's case , it's undoubtedly easier if they've been given a list of juicy targets, rather than have to discover them for themselves. I couldn't have put it better myself. I don't think the person who wants convenience has enable on any ASes routers, or at least I hope not.

One thing I find interesting is that they're using Doubtful Google uses DHCP for anything, their automated provisioning tools are probably quite unique. My best guess is that their stuff in that particular part of app engine is using the space because they've actually near exhausted the rest of rfc, which is pretty impressive.

And yet Google still believes VPN as a security boundary is an anti-pattern since the whole intranet is as weak as it's least secured node. If you already have a proper, working VPN solution for remote access into the internal IP space, which any ISP will already have for network engineer staff and noc purposes Who said anything about making IP addresses public?

You seem to be assuming registering a domain name implies delegating that domain to an actual name server that must respond to public requests. These assumptions are both incorrect. Registering a domain prevents those names from being used for other purposes in the future. Your domain does not have to have valid NS addresses. Even if a domain has NS record with a valid address of the authoritative name server, that server does not have to respond to requests from the public internet.

It doesn't even have to have to be accessible on the public internet. Register a domain for internal use and run an internal name server on e. At the same time, set the real NS records for your internal domain to e. I said nothing about making it public, because I don't view the possibility of someone capturing DNS packet of the kind "A?

The convenience is about not having whatever VPN solution you use to inject DNS recursors into laptop's OS, which end ups being not reasonably solvable when you have two such VPNs you have to use at once. In my opinion it's recommended to do with something that's not a public domain at all, since your DNS is entirely internal, you can set up bind9 servers to be authoritative for the root. You could have it by anything totally arbitrary of your choice for a top level domain, that is a non valid public domain or TLD, like widgets.

See the recent HN discussion of. There is no need to involve ICANN-approved TLDs in your internal DNS infrastructure, particularly if you have management interfaces for a lot of things that are firewalled off or air gapped from ever touching the public internet.

If the global DNS system crashed and burned, you would be in exactly the same place as if you had invented a TLD as you have suggested. But, if that doesn't happen And the way more likely outcome of your "made up TLD" becoming real happens instead, you're in a way worse position. So far I've read you suggest. This is terrible advice. Purchase a public domain name from a real TLD - use it knowing it's yours, and never going to conflict.

I'm using made up words as placeholders like foo, bar, or anything else. Not suggesting you use your own tld of burrito. The point of using a nonsensical example is that your TLD choice for hostnames and rDNS in a management VRF can be entirely arbitrary, since it is not part of "the internet". Typically the name would be something relevant to your needs, such as the name of the company, or AS number. I think what you don't get is that the public root name servers do not need to have anything to do with an entirely internal dns infrastructure.

Not suggesting icann is going to crash and burn either, but that "real" TLD relevance to what you do in rfc IP space in a network that is not routed to the internet is minimal at best. They built their own internal dns for it. Have seen the same at two large CDNs. Their internal authoritaive DNS servers for their management IP space have no connection whatsoever to the public internet or to the lettered root nameservers. One does not imply the other. Buy the domain, know you will never conflict with something, and you're done bar renewal!

I'm trying to picture a co-worker telling the team they went ahead and put all the management interfaces in the. Especially in that disaster-recovery scenario, when you're figuring out how to combine the different namespaces that different disconnected fragments of the internet are using, you really don't want namespace collisions. Namespaces are abstract things that exist outside of the realm of actual network connectivity, and enable you to plan for all kinds of hypotheticals.

EarthIsHome on June 1, root parent prev next [—]. So, for example, the domain google. Is this the correct understanding? But don't you already have the IP address of the misbehaving machine? That's a clever way to get through firewalls. Since there is huge number of IP addresses belonging to 1e On the other way, so other services also use 1e I recommend to use Firefox as browser of course you will still need to disable safebrowing in Firefox and stop using Google products.

I know it is a painful experience to do it but it had to be done! Following standard industry practice, we make sure each IP address has a corresponding hostname. In October , we started using a single domain name to identify our servers across all Google products, rather than use different product domains such as youtube. We did this for two reasons: first, to keep things simpler, and second, to proactively improve security by protecting against potential threats such as cross-site scripting attacks.

Most typical Internet users will never see 1e